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Abstract 
Improving the assessment of credit risk has become a priority for many central banks after the global financial crisis. Central 
banks need to decide how much effort to put into developing credit risk assessment tools, taking into account their resources and 
limitations. This paper proposes a tool that is both pragmatic and conceptually sound, which allows to improve the assessment of 
credit risk for foreign reserves managers and complements the information produced by the rating agencies. The tool we propose 
uses three different credit risk models in order to identify the issuers that have a high, moderate, or low probability of having a 
ratings downgrade below the minimum accepted rating, within the issuers that meet the minimum rating requirements. The 
signals from the tool are built from market and fundamental information of each issuer. Additionally there is a proposal for a 
framework to turn the outputs from the model into investment decisions. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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Conference. 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis and the decreased confidence in credit rating agencies have motivated central banks 
around the world to develop internal tools to measure and manage credit risk. Nonetheless the process of building 
internal capabilities to analyze credit risk is challenging because of the required human and technological resources. 
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A strong process for analyzing credit risk is not enough because it is also necessary to set up a proper institutional 
structure to make investment decisions based on the results of credit analysis. 
Unlike other institutional investors, central banks also have particular needs and constraints that should be taken 
into account. Private sector asset managers have well-defined investment processes to invest in credit but their 
purpose is to identify long and short strategies for corporate bond portfolios, without considering factors that are 
relevant for central banks such as the reputational risk that arises from an event of default. Reputational risk makes 
central banks a particularly risk-averse group of investors. Furthermore some of the market indicators that are widely 
used for credit analysis are not available for all eligible issuers, such as government and government-related debt 
that central banks tend to concentrate their portfolios on. Finally most central banks do not have the same number, 
training, and experience of credit analysts than a rating agency does. 
With the focus to improve credit analysis in central banks, the current paper proposes a straightforward and 
pragmatic assessment tool to complement the information produced by the rating agencies, , as well as  an 
implementation framework in order to use the results of the tool for investment decisions. Instead of proposing the 
ultimate solution for measuring and managing credit risk, the goal of this paper is also to bring points of discussion 
to this relevant but challenging topic. Regardless of the approach chosen, the objective of any methodology to 
improve the assessment of credit risk should be attaining a better understanding of the issuers in the portfolio, 
acknowledging that no methodology can be completely accurate to anticipate credit events. 
This paper has five sections. The first section discusses the main considerations for central banks when 
developing a framework for measuring and managing credit risk. The second section explains in detail the basic 
characteristics of the proposed credit risk assessment tool. The third section recommends a framework to turn the 
signals from the models into actionable investment decisions. The fourth section outlines the limitations of this or 
any other tools to analyze credit risk. The fifth section concludes. 
2. Building a framework to manage credit risk in central banks 
Most central banks have had some credit risk in their portfolios, even before the financial crisis, in the form of 
bank deposits or corporate bonds with the purpose of enhancing return within well-defined risk parameters. The 
financial crisis and its aftermath created awareness among the central bank community regarding two different 
situations. First, the reputation of the credit rating agencies suffered as a result of the inaccuracies they had before 
the financial crisis, particularly in the space of structured securities. Second, government debt issued by developed 
countries was no longer risk-free. As a result, central banks have had to develop some internal infrastructure to make 
a better assessment of the credit risk in their portfolios. 
It is challenging to define how to structure a process to analyze credit risk in central banks because the resources 
available in each institution need to be taken into account. Ideally, from a central bank point of view, each entity 
should develop an independent process that classifies all possible issuers from best to worst and it may be able to 
make a better classification than any rating agency because there are no potential conflicts of interest. That ideal 
process would  be  equivalent  to  building  up  the  infrastructure  of  a  rating  agency  from  scratch. Considering 
that Standard and Poor’s has approximately 23,000 employeesc, even building a team with a hundredth of that 
number can be an insurmountable challenge for most institutions. Given that most central banks do not have the 
resources to go through such an expensive process, some compromises need to be made. 
Although credit ratings sometimes fail to anticipate credit events, for the framework presented in this paper, we 
decided not to dismiss credit ratings entirely, rating agencies: (i) have more resources than an average central bank to 
analyze credit risk; (ii) have more leverage to obtain detailed information from an issuer than any individual analyst 
in an institution because they represent a larger group of investors and are often hired by the entities whose debt they 
rate and (iii) credit ratings are useful to define an eligible investment space because transition matrices can provide 
an indication on past performance of rating agencies and allow each investor to define a minimum rating that is 
consistent with his or her tolerance to credit risk. Consequently, a central bank that dismisses all of the information 
 
 
c http://www.standardandpoors.com/about-sp/key-statistics/en/us 
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from the rating agencies could end up in a worse position than a central bank that relies entirely on ratings.  In 
addition, internal credit analysis could then focus on a reduced number of issuers and make the process more 
efficient. 
In order to minimize reputational risk, the most significant concern for central banks when investing in credit, we 
also decided that it is more effective to use the internal resources to identify the “bad apples” instead of trying to 
have a precise credit assessment or a rating for each issuer. To justify why focusing on identifying “bad apples” is a 
sensible approach for a central bank, it is important to remember that any system that analyses credit risk can have 
type I and type II errors. A type I error occurs when the system identifies a possible default that subsequently does 
not happen while a type II error arises when the system fails to anticipate a default that actually does happen. 
Reputational risk calls for a focus on avoiding type II errors, because, for most central banks, avoiding defaults is 
much more important than missing out on good investment opportunities. Another possible implication of coming up 
with ratings for all eligible issuers in the portfolio is that the investment opportunity set could be reduced because the 
internal system would not be able to cover all the potentially eligible issuers, given the effort needed to analyze each 
individual issuer. Therefore, if the resources are limited, as it is the case in most central banks, it makes sense to 
develop a system where the goal is to identify potential problems with issuers before they are downgraded by the 
rating agencies instead of striving to find the best investment choices. 
The basic framework outlined above, which will be the foundation for the credit assessment  tool  presented  in  
the  following  section,  has  a  very  specific  objective; i.e. to reduce  the probability of facing credit events 
compared to the case when there is complete reliance on rating agencies. In terms of accountability, this approach is 
robust because it makes use of most of the available information, including the information produced by the rating 
agencies but it is not entirely dependent on them. Additionally, if credit rating agencies are consistently biased and 
are ignoring important information about a specific issuer, internal credit analysis should help avoid or reduce 
exposure to that issuer. 
 Although reputational risk is taken above as a given, it is desirable to make efforts to reduce its importance 
because it is a bias that reduces portfolio efficiency. In order to do so, it is important to communicate to both internal 
and external stakeholders that no methodology to analyze credit risk (or any risk for that matter) is perfect. 
Additionally it is important to communicate that a sound investment strategy should be measured by the return of the 
portfolio as a whole and not by the return of individual holdings. This can be achieved through good communication 
but ideally there should be legal provisions that provide a safe harbor for reserve managers to make investment 
decisions. Even the most advanced methodology for credit analysis will fail if it does not deal effectively with 
reputational risk. 
2.1. Information sources and analytical approach 
A broader information set can help make better investment decisions, but too much information can be 
overwhelming and lead to conflicting results. Therefore the information used in a credit risk assessment tool should 
be carefully chosen so that it reflects the most relevant risk factors for each type of issuer. 
The credit risk assessment tool outlined below is based only on quantitative information. The most important 
advantage of quantitative signals is that they are objective measures and, consequently, more useful to support 
investment decisions. When using quantitative measures, the role of the analysts is to make sure that each variable is 
relevant and that the signal is correctly calculated, leaving less room for discretional decisions. The latter can also 
cover a wider universe of issuers without an in-depth analysis about each of them. Quantitative signals can be 
obtained from several sources and this is the area where analytical modeling is required the most. The goal of this 
effort is to find a quantitative signal or combination of signals that alerts about the deteriorating condition of an 
issuer. 
Finance literature divides credit risk models into two classes: structural models and reduced-form models. 
Structural models, such as those proposed by Merton (1974) and Black-Cox (1976), are based on the issuer’s 
financial statements. On the other hand, reduced-form models assume that the information of the structural form of a 
company is not available to the average investor and consequently he or she is forced to incorporate the reduced 
information given by the financial market. The reduced-form models were first developed by Jarrow & Turnbull 
(1995), Duffie & Singleton (1999), Hull & White (2000), among others. The tool proposed in this paper is based on 
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reduced-form models. The reasons why structural models were not used for this tool is the scarcity of data to 
measure credit risk (e.g. stock prices or the value of the assets). The latter is particularly acute in the case of 
government-related issuers, which are relevant for portfolios of foreign reserves. 
3. A traffic lights system for the assessment of credit risk 
The credit risk assessment tool that is proposed in this paper can also be called a “traffic lights system”. The goal 
of this system is to identify the issuers that have a high (red), a moderate (yellow), or low (green) probability of 
having a ratings downgrade below the minimum accepted rating, within the issuers that meet the minimum rating 
requirements. This system would flag alerts about specific issuers and is based on the idea that a combination of 
different signals can help identify “bad apples”.  The most  important  advantages  of this  approach  is  a focus  on 
avoiding credit events (type II error of credit rating agencies) and the fact that it is not necessary to assign a rating to 
each individual issuer in the portfolio. 
The credit risk assessment tool uses three different models to produce signals: market implied ratings, default 
probabilities, and financial ratios. Each model classifies an issuerd  into one of the three categories (green, yellow or 
red). The most important characteristics of each model are presented in Table 1. 
              Table 1. Models used in the credit risk assessment tool. 
 
Characteristics 
Tool 
Market implied Ratings Default probability  Financial ratios 
Objective Define the market implied 
rating. The credit rating of 
an issuer by the spread 
versus risk-free asset 
Calculate the probability of 
default of issuers 
Consolidate relevant credit 
metrics of issuers  
Input information  Option adjusted spread 
(OAS) 
Bond prices Financial statements 
 
Output information  Market implied rating by the 
spread versus risk-free asset. 
Default probability Relative score between 
issuers in the same sector 
(Government, supranational, 
agencies, local authorities, 
banks, and Corporate)  
 
It is interesting to highlight that none of the models uses information from CDS prices. Although CDS prices, in 
theory, are the best instruments to measure the probability of default expected by market participants, in practice 
they have two significant problems that lessen their appeal in a framework that attempts to measure the risk of 
government, government-related, and corporate debt simultaneously. First, the liquidity of credit default swaps is 
lower than that of bond markets, and the quality of the signals may not be as good as desired. Second, CDS prices 
are not available for several issuers that are relevant for portfolios of foreign reserves, such as agencies and 
supranationals. Subsequently they did not prove to be as useful for the specific framework presented here but it is 
reasonable to use them in different assessment frameworks. 
By using three different models, it is possible to analyse different data sets in order to reach more robust 
conclusions, combining information from market prices (market implied ratings and default probabilities) and 
information from financial statements (financial ratios). Each model compares the relevant variables of each issuer 
with those of other relevant peers in order to identify possible outliers. 
The following sections delve deeper into the models, as well as the reasons why they add value to the credit risk 
assessment tool. Although no model is perfect on a stand-alone basis, the combination of the three models can lead 
to a stronger analytical framework and more reliable signals. 
 
 
d Issuers belong to the following sectors: Government, Government Related and Corporate.   
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3.1. Market implied ratings model 
The main objective of this widely known tool is to obtain credit ratings from market information. If market 
participants correctly anticipate changes in the fundamentals, one would expect that implied credit ratings respond to 
changes in the credit profile of issuers before credit rating agencies. 
 
The model used to obtain market implied ratings was developed by Ludovic Breger, Lisa Goldberg & Oren 
Cheyette (2003).  In order to define the implied credit rating the model classifies each issuer within different limits. 
The limits are calculated from the option adjusted spreads of the bonds issued by the assessed entities minimizing 
the following penalty function: 
 
          j j j ji j i j
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  
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  
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Number of issuers with credit rating :l lN  
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The decision variables are the set of limits between implied rating classese: 
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Therefore, the following conditions must be met: 
 
0  AAA AA A BBB BB B
AA A BBB BB B CCC
b b b b b b zd d d d d d d                               (3) 
Where Z represents the maximum average option adjusted spread, given the set of evaluated issuers. 
 
 
 
e The tool only allows the use of the following categories: AAA, AA, A BBB, BB, B, and CCC.  
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The value of the parameter sj is given by the average of the OAS of a select number of bonds issued by issuer j. 
Selected bonds meet a given minimum issue size and a given maximum maturity. The plus sign outside the 
parenthesis, (x)+, indicates that the value will only be added if it is positive. 
Therefore, the results of the exercise will be the b values, which are used to analyse each issuer individually. 
Once the transition limits have been established, it is possible to compare the spread of each issuer with the limit 
spread defined by the tool for its credit rating given by the agencies. This comparison enables to determine if the 
issuer’s rating is correct or if it should be higher or lower according to the market. 
Figure 1 (below) shows an example of the results of an exercise using a histogram. The horizontal axis shows the 
OAS. As expected, the lower the credit rating, the higher the OAS to compensate the investor for a higher risk. The 
vertical axis shows the number of issuers for each interval. The vertical lines indicate the implicit limits that were 
calculated by the tool, and bars are coloured according to Moody’s Investors Service´s ratings. Therefore, if a bar 
that represents a rating is found within the limits of another category, this shows the number of issuers that should 
have a different rating. For example, the blue bars that are beyond the limit of their category in figure 1 represent the 
12 issuers with AAA rating that should have a lower rating. The tool allows an identification of these issuers in 
order to trigger warnings. 
In order to turn implied credit ratings into actionable signals, a simple criterion is used. The red category is 
assigned to issuers whose market implied ratings fall two levels (or more) below the minimum accepted rating and 
the yellow category is assigned to issuers whose implied ratings fall one level below the minimum accepted rating. 
All other issuers are included in the green category. For example, if the minimum accepted rating is A, an issuer can 
end up with a yellow signal if its market implied rating is BBB or a red signal if its market implied credit rating is 
BB.  
The model may occasionally generate false alarms due to the fact that option-adjusted spreads do not depend 
solely on the creditworthiness of the issuer. Changes of spreads may also be the consequence of the illiquidity of the 
bonds used for the calculation. Therefore, the tool’s trigger warnings must be analysed in order to assess their 
accuracy before one of the three categories can be selected. An additional aspect to consider is that the bond spread 
also depends on the maturity of each bond. In order to solve this problem, the tool calculates the market implied 
ratings for different maturity buckets (0-3 years, 3-5 years, 5-10 years and 10 years or more). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1. Example of the results of the market implied ratings model 
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3.2. Default probabilities model 
The default probabilities model attempts to estimate the probability of default for the issuers. The model that was 
used for this estimation was developed by Vrugt (2011) and its goal is to calculate the issuer’s risk-neutral default 
probability and its recovery rate. The tool calculates the default probability with a given recovery rate, or it can 
simultaneously calculate both (recovery rate and default probability) from bond prices. Although there are other 
models to estimate default probabilities, such as structural or scoring models, one of the advantages of reduced-form 
models such as Vrugt’s is that it is possible to estimate probabilities of default for government- related issuers, such 
as agencies and supranationals, since the probabilities are estimated from market variables such as bond prices. 
The basic idea behind the model is to calculate the price of the bond in terms of the default probability and the 
recovery rate. The bond price is defined as the sum of the present value of all the possible cash flows, adjusted by its 
probability of occurrence. 
The model developed by Vrugt (2011) follows the binomial model to price credit-risky debt in a discreet time. 
The bond price is given by: 
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Since bonds don’t have any optionality, the cash flows are known at any given time. The recovery rate is 
assumed to be 49%f. However, the system does allow this percentage to be altered or estimated along with the 
default probability. 
Once the previous parameters are estimated, the only unknown value remaining will be the default probability at 
time n in order to be able to calculate bond prices. To estimate the probability Vrugt (2011) uses equation 6 which is 
the first part of the Nelson and Siegel formula for the term structure of yields. 
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f Moody´s Investors Service (2014)   
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In the previous equation, t stands for time of the next bond´s cash flow, which allows the default probability to be 
known at a time t. The α and β parameters determine the structure of the default probabilities over time. Therefore, 
the default probability at time 0 (or the instant default probability) will be α+β, while the same probability at infinity 
converges to α. 
According to the above, it is possible to define the bond price with credit risk as, 
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                              (7) 
Therefore if the market prices of the bonds of a certain issuer are known, it is possible to estimate values α and β, 
minimizing the sum of the squared differences between the real price and the estimated price calculated with 
equation (7). The optimization problem will be given by the following objective function: 
 
 2
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min  ˆj j
RV
j J
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¦                    (8) 
The variables are α, β, and RV or, just α and β if RV is known. The J set contains the bonds issued by the issuer. 
The restrictions to be considered in the case of a fixed RV are: 
 
0 D t                    (9)
                                   
0 D E t                   (10) 
 
Therefore, the result of this exercise will be the values for α and β, which help determine the issuer’s default 
probability for different periods of time. 
In order to calculate the real world default probability from the risk-neutral default probability the model uses the 
approximation proposed by Jorge. A. Chan-Lau (2006). 
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Where:  
 
: The real default probabilityp  
: The risk-neutral default probabilityS  
: Marginal utility of wealthu  
: RecoveryValueRV  
 
It is important to keep in mind that in Vrugt’s proposed methodology, the expected default probability will be 
overestimated if it is not possible to isolate the liquidity premium of the bonds used in the estimate adequately. 
Therefore, one should set limits regarding the size and the maturity of the bonds used as input for the model. 
Additionally, only bonds without optionality can be used. 
The  model  of  default  probabilities  assigns  a  red  category  to  the  issuers  whose probabilities of default are 
above a pre-defined value. The pre-defined value for the red category is the average of the probabilities of default of 
the last twelve months of a group of issuers rated two levels below the minimum accepted rating, and the pre-
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defined value for the yellow category is the average of the probabilities of default of the last twelve months of a 
group of issuers rated one level below the minimum accepted rating.  All other issuers are included in the green 
category. 
The rationale for using both the market implied ratings and the default probability model, despite the fact that the 
two models are based on market prices, is to account for the fact that different methodologies can obtain different 
results, given the inputs and the approach to the assessment of each issuer. The final purpose is then to obtain more 
robust conclusions about the market perception of an issuer and to be less sensitive to the choice of the model. 
3.3. Financial ratios model 
Studying financial ratios is a common practice among credit analysts because it shows a fundamental picture of 
the credit risk of the issuer that is not affected by market volatility. Although market information is timelier to 
identify sudden changes, it is also subject to overreactions and often ignores the fundamental condition of the issuer, 
both for better or for worse. Data from financial statements provides a comprehensive picture of the issuer and 
potential sources of risk ignored by the market. 
Based on the most common exposures of central banks, six sets of financial ratios were developed for each 
relevant sector (government, agencies, supranational, local authorities, corporate and banks). Several fundamental 
factors from the issuer are taken into account, such as liquidity, profitability and leverage, without attempting to 
make any forward projections. It was necessary  to  create  different  sets  of  financial  ratios  for  each  sector  since  
the  information available, the potential vulnerabilities and the relevant factors can differ significantly depending on  
the  type  of  issuer.  For  example,  the  debt/GDP  ratio  is  useful  to  assess  the  level  of indebtedness of 
governments but cannot be used in the same fashion for corporates. Table 2 shows the indicators chosen for each of 
the sectors. 
                   Table 2. Selected financial ratios for different sectors. 
Sector Factor Ratio / Variable 
Sovereign Fiscal situation General Govt. Gross Debt % of GDP 
Surplus or Deficit % of GDP 
Current account Current Account Balance % of GDP 
Supranational Entity status / Support Preferred creditor status (Yes/No) 
% Owners Investment Grade 
Paid in capital/Subscribed capital 
Credit quality  Risk weightings 
Basel II RSA/ Revised Standardized Approach) 
Leverage Total Debt/Total Assets 
Total Debt/ Equity 
Total Debt/ Equity(+sub Capital) 
Liquidity  Liquid Assets/Total Assets 
Profitability  Return on Equity 
Return on Assets 
Agencies  Support - Sovereign Guarantee (Yes/No) 
Ownership (%) 
Rating-Sovereign/Parent 
Leverage Total Debt/Total Assets 
Liquidity  Liquid Assets /Total Assets 
Liquid Assets /Debt Payments Due Next Year  
Profitability Return on Equity 
Return on Assets 
Local Authorities Financial performance  Net Direct and Guaranteed Debt/Operating Revenue 
Net Direct and Guaranteed Debt/Gross State Product 
Gross Operating Balance/Operating Revenue  
Interest Payments/Total Revenue 
Economic fundamentals Real Gross State Product growth (% change) 
Banks Profitability  Return on Assets 
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Return on Equity 
Net Income / RWA (risk weighted assets) 
Net Interest Margin 
Asset quality  Non-Performing Loans to Total Loans 
Non-Performing Assets to Total Assets 
Reserve for Loan Losses / Non Performing Assets (%) 
Liquidity /Funding Liquid Assets/ Total Assets 
Core Deposits / Total Funding  
Cash Flow  / Total Liabilities 
Capital adequacy Tier 1 ratio (%) 
Shareholder´s Equity / Total Assets 
Corporates Leverage  Total Debt/Common Equity  
Total Debt/ Total Capital  
Total Debt/ Total Assets 
Cash flow and coverage Current Ratio 
Quick Ratio 
EBIT/ Total Interest Incurred 
Funds From Operations /Total Debt 
Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
Profitability  Net Profit Margin 
Gross Margin 
Operating Margin 
Return on Assets 
Return on Common Equity 
Return on Capital 
 
Each of the financial ratios of the issuers that meet the minimum rating requirements in each sector is 
standardized from zero to one. For the standardization, it must assign zero to the worst value and one to the best 
value. The experience of the credit analyst plays a crucial role since he or she assigns a weight to each financial ratio 
according to their importance. Liu & Tan (2009) point out that this is also a key factor to explain the differences in 
the ratings of various agenciesg. The model then calculates a score for each issuer using a weighted average of the 
standardised ratios calculated in the first step. This way, the tool allows comparing different issuers in the same 
sector.  The results obtained from this tool are not comparable among different sectors, since each of the sets of 
financial ratios includes different variables. 
 
In order to assign a colour category to an issuer, the model follows a five step process: 
 
x Standardise from zero to one each of the financial ratios of the issuers that meet the minimum rating 
requirements in a specific sector. 
x Assign a weight to each of the financial ratios according to their importance. 
x Calculate a score for each issuer using a weighted average of the standardized ratios calculated in the first step. 
x Calculate  the  average  and  standard  deviation  of  the  scores  calculated  in  the previous step. 
x Define a category for each issuer: the model assigns a red category to an issuer whose score is below 1.5 
standard deviations of the mean and assigns a yellow category if the score is below 1 standard deviations of the 
mean. 
 
It is important to point out that the credit indicators were selected with the goal of obtaining a general overview 
of the issuer and not with the objective of providing an in-depth fundamental analysis. To achieve this, a larger 
 
 
g “The approaches to subnational ratings among the three major rating agencies are strikingly similar. Not only do they adopt a similar rating 
process, they also share similar rating criteria. What could differentiate one rating agency from another is the relative weight they assign to each 
rating variable, the importance they attach to the qualitative variables and how the relative weights of these variables change over time”.   
154   Marco Ruíz et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  29 ( 2015 )  144 – 157 
amount of resources and expert knowledge would be required. The ideal way of assigning a colour category would 
be to define key levels for financial ratios and generate signals whenever ratios are outside the defined boundaries. 
This approach is demanding as it requires the definition of key levels for each ratio in each sector (government, 
government-related, corporate, etc.) since financial ratios are not comparable between sectors. As a starting point, 
the proposed approach attempts to pinpoint the outliers or the issuers with the weakest credit indicators from a 
sample of entities. 
Nevertheless it is also important to be aware of the limitations of using ratio analysis in general. First, it depends 
on accounting measures, which may require adjustment for different accounting standards and are more sensitive to 
manipulation. Second, accounting ratios are not found in short frequencies and are not forward-looking and, as a 
consequence, may be slow to react to sudden changes in the environment. Finally, this approach is less useful for 
government-related debt (e.g. supranational and agency debt), which make up a significant part of official 
institutions portfolios, because the financial ratios of many entities may be weak on a stand-alone basis, for instance 
in the case of entities with very low or negative capital. 
There are other models that use financial ratios as inputs such as logit, probit or discriminant analysis models.  
The proposed approach does not use these models since the number of defaults in the investment universe of central 
banks is reduced and these kinds of models do not allow the estimation of robust coefficients. 
4. Turning signals into investment decisions 
The models explained above are useful to produce credit alerts on specific issuers but the whole idea of 
improving the analysis is to manage credit risk more effectively. Therefore it is necessary to put these signals 
together and develop a decision-making process that turns alerts into investment decisions. 
In order to create a single signal from the outputs of the three models, a simple aggregation methodology was 
chosen. Figure 2 shows the classification that was used. As an illustration, if an issuer has been classified in the red 
category by the three models, the final category is red. However, if the issuer has been classified in the red category 
by one model and in the green category by two models, the final flag is yellow. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Traffic Lights System 
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Up to this point, the analysis of qualitative indicators such as management skills, business outlook for the issuer, 
credibility of policies, and degree of support from the government has been all but excluded from the process. 
However any experienced credit analyst can argue that qualitative indicators play a very important role in the 
assessment of an issuer because not all relevant information can be quantified or obtained from market prices. 
There are at least two ways in which qualitative analysis can be incorporated into our process. A scorecard with 
qualitative variables could be created and incorporated as a fourth source of signals. Additionally qualitative 
analysis could play a role in the classification process shown in Figure 2 because it could give a larger weight to one 
of the models, depending on the relative importance or it could also modify some of the results obtained. 
Consequently, developing a credit assessment tool based only on quantitative indicators does not preclude 
qualitative analysis. 
A proper qualitative analysis requires a team of analysts that are highly qualified in credit research. The number 
of analysts required will vary according to the complexity and number of the issuers in the portfolio but roughly it 
may be necessary that each analyst covers 10 to 20 names. Qualitative credit analysis is a complicated process 
where a lot of different factors have to be considered and some subjective weight has to be assigned to the different 
variables. As a result, only experts should produce qualitative signals. Putting together a team of credit experts 
within a central bank would be challenging for various reasons; e.g. compensations differences against the private 
sector. An additional element that needs to be considered when using qualitative judgement is that it is crucial to 
define clear boundaries in terms of what is expected from the credit analysts. It is impossible for a single analyst to 
uncover every stone, especially if he or she does not have a lot of training and experience evaluating credit risk. 
 The importance of qualitative analysis should be relatively small for institutions that are only starting to build an 
internal infrastructure because it is important to take time to train credit analysts properly if it is not easy to hire 
them directly from the outside. As the quantity and quality of credit analysts increases, the weight given to 
quantitative analysis should also increase. The main advantage of getting started with quantitative measures is that 
they are more objective and have less room for interpretation. 
The signals obtained from the credit assessment tool presented above may be used to make investment decisions, 
through a well-defined process. For instance, it is possible that the limit for an issuer with moderate risk (yellow) is 
scaled down while the limit for an issuer with high risk (red) is zero. This is an automatic process that leaves little 
room for second-guessing and it also meets the goal of identifying “bad apples” in time. This analysis can be 
performed with a predetermined frequency and, once a “bad apple” is detected, it is reasonable to allow a window of 
several days to reduce or decrease the exposure in order to minimize transaction costs. This is also useful in cases 
where it is desirable to investigate the nature of the alert, and try  to  determine  its  relevance,  considering  that  
there  may  be  problems  with  the  data  or calculation errors. At this point it is important that the institution is 
comfortable with the signals generated by its tool, which might require assessing its output during a period of time. 
Building a tool to identify potential problems and dealing with them more effectively can be managed with the 
proper corporate governance. An institution with qualified staff and a clear decision-making structure can define 
clear accountability in terms of who makes decisions. As the complexity of credit analysis increases, so does the 
complexity of the decision-making process to manage credit more effectively. All of those involved in the process 
could have clearly defined responsibilities, for example: 
  
x Senior central bank officials might be responsible for making decisions on overall exposures to certain sectors or 
asset classes and for approving the process to making investment decisions, without making decisions on 
individual cases. 
x Senior risk managers could have authority to decrease limits for new investments based on the analysis 
performed by their teams. 
x Any decision to sell investments that are currently in the portfolio should be based on objective criteria, 
especially quantitative indicators. 
 
For any decision-making process to work appropriately, everyone should be able to understand the reasons why a 
particular decision was made. Although it is possible to think of much more complicated methodologies than the 
ones presented here, its most important advantage is its simplicity, which avoids making decisions from a black box. 
The portfolio managers should have the chance to express their opinion both regarding the decisions and the 
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underlying models in order to make the process stronger and avoid arbitrary decision-making. The communication 
between portfolio managers and risk managers should be fluid and can occur on a daily basis but any difference of 
opinion should have a proper escalation procedure with senior managers that should be available at least monthly. 
However it is also important that the objections of the portfolio managers are non-binding because risk-management 
decisions need to be independent. 
5. Limitations of credit assessment 
Improved analysis of credit risk is a worthwhile undertaking for a central bank. However it is very important to 
highlight that the credit assessment tool presented in this paper, like any other process to improve the analysis of 
credit risk, faces significant limitations. The most salient limitations are outlined below: 
 
x For several issuers, there is not enough publicly available information. Consequently it is more difficult to come 
up with robust credit assessments. In those cases, it may be possible to consider the possibility of avoiding 
investments in those names altogether. 
x Even the most sophisticated analytical framework can make a bad recommendation if the analysis is based on 
false or misleading information provided by external sources.  
x Neither quantitative models nor qualitative analysis has perfect foresight about future events. Therefore it is 
impossible to predict quite a few detrimental events. 
x The role of qualitative signals should have clearly defined objectives such as identifying risks that are not 
captured through quantitative indicators alone. Qualitative analysts should not be responsible for knowing 
everything well in advance of everybody else. 
 
These limitations should be taken into account when evaluating the role of credit analysts and those responsible 
for making investment decisions. An improved assessment of credit risk must be evaluated on a best effort basis, 
considering that those involved are doing their best to manage the portfolio according to the risk preferences of the 
central bank. Therefore any failures to identify credit events should not lead to finger pointing, taking into account 
that it is impossible to create a perfect system to analyse credit risk. 
6. Final remarks 
The framework outlined in this paper is an illustration of how to build a consistent and robust process to manage 
credit risk in central banks, considering their limitations in terms of resources. The credit assessment tool presented 
here uses a broad range of information sources, processes the information using different methodologies, and 
provides a framework to make investment decisions based on the results of the process. The most important goal of 
this methodology is to allow a better understanding of the issuers in the portfolio. It is important to keep in mind that 
the proposed framework, like any other approach to analyse credit risk, is a dynamic process that should constantly 
consider new information and new methodologies to improve the assessment. 
It is important to highlight that no methodology to analyse credit risk can guarantee the avoidance of credit 
events, because the process relies on public information that has flaws and biases and because it is impossible to 
forecast future events with certainty. This is a fact that should be communicated clearly to both internal and external 
stakeholders. Additionally the analytical effort should use all the information available.  The information from the 
rating agencies should not be ignored because the resources of these entities are vastly superior to those of a central 
bank. Subsequently reducing the reliance on credit rating agencies as the sole provider of analysis of credit risk is a 
more sensible goal than trying to eradicate completely the use of credit ratings. 
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